What the public sees
The death of Nana Yaw Kyere, popularly known as Dinero, has shocked many Ghanaians. One detail in the police account has prompted an immediate question: how could anyone buy an iPhone 12 for GH¢100 and not know that something was wrong?
That reaction is understandable. A phone usually worth far more being sold for GH¢100 calls for scrutiny. Many people would suspect that the seller lacked the right to sell it. But a suspicious price and proof of a criminal offence are different things. The legal question is what the buyer knew about the phone when he received it.
The public should take the allegation seriously while leaving room for the investigation and the court to establish the facts. An unusually cheap purchase is evidence worth examining; it is not, by itself, a verdict.
The reported facts
According to the police statement reported by the Ghana News Agency on 28 September 2026, Philip Dzifa Kofi Tefe allegedly sold Nana Yaw Kyere’s iPhone 12 for GH¢100. Police recovered the phone. They said that Sunday Omeje, the buyer, had been cautioned and detained for allegedly receiving it dishonestly.
The account does not establish what Omeje was told before the sale, whether he knew the seller, whether the phone was locked, where and when the exchange took place, or how Omeje explained the transaction. Those missing details matter. Detention or an allegation of dishonest receiving is not a finding of guilt.
What the law requires
Sections 146 and 147 of the Criminal Offences Act, 1960 (Act 29) address dishonest receiving of property obtained or appropriated through an offence. Knowledge that the property came from a crime is central to that offence. In Nyina v Commissioner of Police [1964] GLR 452, the Supreme Court stressed the need to prove guilty knowledge at the time of receipt.
Two kinds of knowledge must therefore be kept separate. A buyer may know that an iPhone 12 normally costs thousands of cedis but believe that its seller owns it and has chosen to accept an unusually low price. That differs from knowing that the phone was obtained through a crime and taking it anyway. The price may help a court infer knowledge when considered with all the circumstances; it should not replace an examination of those circumstances.
The Sale of Goods Act, 1962 (Act 137), including section 10 on the seller’s implied undertaking as to title, recognises the seller’s right to sell as a basic part of a sale. That does not excuse someone who knowingly receives stolen property. It helps explain why buyers ordinarily deal with a person presenting himself as entitled to sell. Contract law also does not generally require a bargain price to equal market value. People sell cheaply for many reasons. Neither point makes a suspicious transaction innocent; each shows why the price alone cannot tell the whole story.
Why the surrounding circumstances matter
Imagine an open sale in a busy market during the day. The seller behaves like the owner and gives a plausible reason for needing quick cash. Now imagine a midnight meeting in a hidden place, where the seller says, “Take this phone for GH¢100. Don’t ask where I got it.” The price is the same, but the evidence about the buyer’s knowledge is markedly different.
Investigators should ask where and when the sale happened; what the seller said; whether Omeje knew him; whether the phone was locked; whether any explanation was offered for the price; and what Omeje did with the device afterwards. His own account and any messages, witnesses or records of the transaction may support or undermine an innocent explanation. The answers, rather than the price viewed in isolation, may determine what inference is justified.
Payment is not essential to the issue of dishonest receiving. Suppose a person knows a friend stole a phone and agrees to hide it from the police without receiving any money. Paying GH¢0 would not make that person innocent simply because no bargain was struck. The central issue remains knowledge and conduct.
Section 148 of Act 29 adds an important qualification. Where a person charged with dishonest receiving had possession or control of property reasonably suspected of being stolen or unlawfully obtained and cannot give an account satisfactory to the court of how it came into his possession, the section permits a rebuttable presumption concerning the property and the offence, in the absence of evidence to the contrary. Omeje’s explanation may therefore have real legal significance. Suspicion, proof and a statutory presumption must each be considered on their proper terms.
If investigation shows that Omeje did not know the phone came from a crime, he may also be an important witness. He may be able to describe who supplied the phone, when and where they met, what was said, and how it passed into his possession. That evidence may help the prosecution establish the movements of Dinero’s phone after the alleged crime.
Conclusion
The death of Dinero is tragic. Those responsible must face the law. But the gravity of that case does not remove the need to prove the distinct elements of an allegation against the buyer.
An iPhone 12 sold for GH¢100 is suspicious. The better question is not merely, “Who would buy it at that price?” It is: When Sunday Omeje received this particular phone, did he know it had been obtained through a crime?
If that knowledge is proved, directly or by a proper inference from the transaction and the other evidence, the low price may be an important part of the case. If it is not proved and no applicable statutory presumption sustains the allegation, an extraordinary bargain should not by itself turn a buyer into a criminal.
This commentary concerns publicly reported allegations in an ongoing investigation. References to suspects are not findings of guilt. Only a competent court can determine guilt or innocence.