Ghana's Virtual Asset Regime: Dual Mandates, One Ambiguous Line
On 2 September 2026, the Bank of Ghana published its formal Policy Position on Virtual Assets and Service Providers, the final public document in a sequence that began with the assent of the Virtual Asset Service Providers Act (Act 1154) in December 2025. The policy operationalises a dual-regulator architecture in which the Bank of Ghana and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) share oversight of virtual asset service providers (VASPs), with the Financial Intelligence Centre (FIC) playing a complementary role. The question this architecture raises is not whether Ghana should regulate virtual assets — the answer is plainly yes — but whether two sovereign-minded institutions can share a single regulatory perimeter without producing the very gaps and overlaps the Act was designed to close.
The Legislative Framework
Act 1154, assented on 24 December 2025, is the first comprehensive statute in West Africa to govern the entire lifecycle of virtual asset activity: issuance, exchange, custody, and provision of related services. The Act assigns licensing and registration authority to both the Bank of Ghana and the SEC, a division that appears to track the conventional split between monetary-stability concerns and capital-market regulation. The Bank of Ghana has established a dedicated Virtual Assets Department, and the SEC confirmed its regulatory remit in a press release dated 29 December 2025. The FIC's role, though not the subject of a separate statute here, is embedded in the Act's anti-money-laundering provisions.
The Core Tension
The Bank of Ghana's mandate under the Banks and Specialised Depository Institutions Act is anchored in monetary sovereignty: maintaining currency integrity, managing inflation, and safeguarding the external accounts. Virtual assets — particularly stablecoins denominated in foreign currencies — are, by their design, a bypass mechanism for those instruments. The SEC, by contrast, operates under a securities-law paradigm where investor protection and market efficiency are the primary values. When a single product (a tokenised deposit, for instance, or a utility token with transferable value) sits at the intersection of both mandates, the Act does not clearly state which institution has first-instance jurisdiction.
This ambiguity is not merely academic. The Joint Notice on Unauthorized Marketing issued by the Bank of Ghana and the SEC on 20 February 2026 instructed VASPs to cease all marketing activities to the Ghanaian public pending full licensing. The notice's joint issuance is itself a signal that coordination is functioning at the enforcement level, but it does not resolve the underlying question of who decides, in a contested case, whether a given virtual asset is a "security," a "payment instrument," or something else entirely.
The Sandbox as Interim Measure
In January 2026, the SEC announced a Virtual Asset Sandbox programme, creating a bounded environment in which VASPs could test products under regulatory supervision before applying for full licences. The sandbox is a sensible transitional device, but it introduces a second layer of institutional interaction: the SEC administers the sandbox while the Bank of Ghana retains its broader monetary-policy surveillance. Practitioners will inevitably test the boundaries — which products qualify for the sandbox, what monitoring the Bank of Ghana expects, and how a sandbox participant's failure reflects on the regulator that admitted it.
The Strongest Counterargument
The dual-regulator design is not an accidental flaw; it is a deliberate import of a model used in several Common Law jurisdictions (Australia, the United Kingdom) where financial services and securities regulation are split between distinct bodies.
Making the regulatory boundary workable
A dual-regulator structure can reflect the different risks posed by payments, investment products and mixed services, but it also creates an immediate problem for firms whose activities cross those categories. Operators need to know which authority receives an application, which rules govern conduct and how inconsistent directions will be resolved. Those practical questions cannot safely be answered from a general policy announcement alone; the operative legislation and any implementing instruments must be read together.
The regulators could reduce uncertainty by publishing joint guidance on hybrid products, a common referral procedure and reasons for jurisdictional decisions. Those proposals follow from the overlap described in this article and should be tested against the law as implemented. Clear boundaries would help providers comply and would make regulatory decisions easier for courts and the public to scrutinise.