On 11 September 2026, the Supreme Court of Canada issued its judgment in R. v. R.B.-C. (2026 SCC 30), addressing whether the presumptive time ceilings established in R. v. Jordan (2016) should extend to the sentencing phase of criminal proceedings.
The appellant, convicted of sexual assault in 2021, argued that a 225-day gap between conviction and the imposition of sentence violated section 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, which guarantees the right to be tried within a reasonable time.
The Court dismissed the appeal on its central procedural question. It held that the 18-month and 30-month presumptive ceilings from Jordan, designed to correct a culture of systemic complacency in pre-trial preparation, cannot be transplanted to the sentencing stage. The Court found no comparable evidence of a systemic delay problem at the sentencing phase to justify a separate fixed ceiling.
Instead, the Court confirmed that the "markedly longer" test, previously used in R. v. K.G.K. (2020) for pre-trial trial delay, is the appropriate standard for post-verdict sentencing delay. Under this test, a delay is unreasonable if it is markedly longer than what would reasonably be expected given the complexity of the case and other contextual factors. The Court applied the test to the facts and found the delay was indeed markedly longer, but determined that the appropriate remedy was a reduction in the sentence rather than a stay of proceedings.
The decision clarifies that the Charter right to a reasonable-time trial extends beyond the verdict to encompass the sentencing stage.
Why the distinction matters
The reported Canadian ruling recognises that unreasonable delay can remain a concern after a verdict, while declining to set a single presumptive ceiling for every sentencing case. That approach leaves courts to consider the circumstances behind a particular interval and its effect on the person awaiting sentence.
For those involved in criminal proceedings, reasons for adjournments and a reliable record of the steps taken become important. The decision supplies a framework for scrutiny rather than permission for unexplained delay; the precise constitutional test should be taken from the judgment.